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EVA SIMPSON et al., Appellants, v. 'r:HE CITY OF LOS 
ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents; MEDI-
CAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATION (a Corporation) 
et al., Interveners and Respondents. 
[1] Municipal Corporations-Remedies of Taxpayers-Injunction 
Against Illegal Expenditures.-Resident taxpayers of a city 
are entitled to sue to prevent alleged illegal expenditures of 
municipal funds in enforcing an ordinance relating to sur-
render of unclaimed impounded animals for purpose of medical 
research. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526a.) 
[2] Elections-Duty of Court to Validate Elections.-Courts are 
reluctant to defeat the fair expression of popular will in 
elections and will not do so unless required by the plain 
mandate of the law. 
[3] Municipal Corporations-Municipal Elections.-Where printed 
arguments mailed to voters with respect to a proposed munic-
ipal ordinance were prepared pursuant to provisions of the 
city charter that the clerk shall prescribe the form of print-
ing and the character of paper to be used, and there is no 
allegation that the city clerk acted improperly or that he 
was aware of instructions assertedly given to opponents of the 
measure by the assistant city attorney that any printed argu-
ments which the opponents desired to have mailed to the 
voters with the sample ballot must be on newsprint of a speci-
fied size and that no rotogravure would be allowed, and where, 
moreover, such attorney had no authority to bind the city 
by giving these instructions, such matters do not constitute 
grounds for invalidating adoption of the measure. 
[ 4] Evidence-Judicial Notice-:-Municipal Ordinances.-The Su-
preme Court cannot take judicial notice of city ordinances. 
[5] Pleading-Ordinances.-A complaint involving the validity of 
a city ordinance does not sufficiently plead the ordinance 
where it does not quote the language of the section in ques-
tion or state its effect, nor give the title or date of passage. 
[6] Animals-Dogs-Licenses and Police Regulations.-The licens-
ing, impounding and disposition of dogs are not exclusively 
municipal affairs, and if there is any conflict between an 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Municipal Corporations, § 478; [2] 
Elections, § 70; [3] Municipal Corporations, § 265; [ 4] Evidence, 
q8; [5] Pleading, § 16; [6, 13-17] Animals, §55; [7] Municipal 
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ordinance relating to such matters and the 
latter will prevail. ( Const., art. XI, § 11.) 
Municipal Corporation-Ordinances-Conflict 
-A city under its police power may enact 
which do not conflict with general statutes. 
XI, § 11.) 
[40 C.2d 
state law, the 
With Statutes. 
local measures 
( Const., art. 
[8] Animals-Licenses and Police Regulations.-Agr. Code, §§ 391-
403, regulating the seizure and disposition of cstrayed stock 
and domestic animals generally, do not operate to invalidate 
a city ordinance relating to surrender of unclaimed impounded 
animals for purpose of medical research. 
[9] !d.-Licenses and Police Regulations.-There is no inconsist-
ency between a city ordinance relating to surrender of un-
claimed impounded animals for purpose of medical research 
and a general law which relates to the running at large of 
dogs and protection of livestock and provides for the licens-
ing, impounding and disposition of dogs. (1 Deering's Gen. 
Laws, Act. 384; Stats. 1921, p. 1306, as amended.) 
[10] !d.-Licenses and Police Regulations.-Pen. Code, §§ 597, 
599b, 599c, which define and prohibit cruelty to animals, do 
not occupy the same field as a city ordinance relating to sur-
render of unclaimed impounded animals for purpose of med-
ical research, and such ordinance prevails where there is 
nothing therein which conflicts with the code provisions. 
[11] !d.-Cruelty to Animals.-Purpose of Pen. Code, § 599c, de-
claring that nothing in the code sections relating to cruelty 
to animals shall be construed as "interfering ... with prop-
erly conducted scientific experiments or investigations per-
formed under the authority of the faculty of a regularly in-
corporated medical college or university of this state," is to 
limit the effect of the provisions prohibiting cruelty to ani-
mals rather than to regulate the disposition of impounded 
animals. 
[12] !d.-Licenses and Police Regulations.-While research insti-
tutions other than medical colleges or universities may re-
ceive animals for experimental purposes under a city ordi-
nance relating to surrender of unclaimed impounded animals 
for purpose of medical research, this does not conflict with 
the Penal Code prohibitions of cruel or improper experi-
ments where the ordinance specifically provides that the hos-
pitals or research institutions which receive dogs must have 
been certified as organizations which will use them "humanely 
... for the good of mankind and the increase of knowledge 
relating to the cause, prevention, control and cure of disease." 
[7] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations,§ 224; Am.Jur., Munic-
ipal Corporations, § 165. 
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[13] !d.-Dogs-Licenses and Police Regulations.-The licensing 
of dogs and the regulation of the manner in which they shall 
be kept and controlled are within the legitimate sphere of 
the police power, and statutes and regulations may provide 
for impounding dogs and for their destruction or other dis-
position. 
[14] Id. -Dogs- Licenses and Police Regulations.- When dogs 
have been lawfully impounded under the police power and 
have become subject to disposition under the terms of a city 
ordinance relating to surrender of unclaimed impounded ani-
mals for purpose of medical research, private property rights 
in such dogs must, in the interests of public welfare, be treated 
as having been terminated. 
[15] Id.- Dogs- Licenses and Police Regulations.- Where one 
subsection of a city ordinance provides that no animal shall 
be surrendered for medical research until it has been im-
pounded for at least five days, and another subsection pro-
vides that the owner, if known, must be notified in every 
case a dog is impounded, regardless of the proposed method 
of disposing of the animal, and the city must act to give 
such notiee within one day after the dog is impounded, the 
first subsection contemplates and requires compliance with 
the notice provisions of the other subsection and, when con-
sidered together, the subsections require that the city must 
act to give notice to the owner, if known, within one day 
after a dog is impounded and the owner must have at least 
five days after receipt of such notice in which to reclaim the 
animal. 
[16] Id.- Dogs- Licenses and Police Regulations.- Where a 
city ordinance requiring the city to give notice to the owner, 
if known, within one day after a dog is impounded does not 
specify the method by which the owner shall be notified of 
the impounding, the owner is entitled to actual notice. 
[17] Id. -Dogs- Licenses and Police Regulations.- Provision 
of city ordinance requiring dogs to wear a numbered tag at 
all times when at large on the streets is a reasonable require-
ment, and an owner can insure his getting notice of im-
pounding of a dog in all but exceptional cases by complying 
with the ordinance. 
[18] !d.-Licenses and Police Regulations.-A city ordinance re-
lating to surrender of unclaimed impounded animals for pur-
pose of medical research does not deprive owners of their 
property without a hearing, where provisions of the ordinance 
that an owner may redeem an impounded animal on payment 
[13] See Cal.Jur.2d, Animals, § 24; Am.Jur., Animals, § 31 et 
seq. 
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of certain fees and that any animal unlawfully taken up or 
impounded shall be immediately delivered on demand therefor 
to the owner or person entitled to its custody contemplate a 
factual or mixed factual and legal determination shall be 
made by the department collecting the fees, and hence must 
be interpreted to provide for a hearing, when requested by 
the owner, on the question of whether a dog has been legally 
seized. 
[19] !d.-Licenses and Police Regulations.-The surrender of im-
pounded, unclaimed animals to private research laboratories 
and institutions, as provided by a city ordinance, is not a 
gift of public property within the meaning of Const., art. IV, 
§§ 22, 31, since the animals are to be used for a public pur-
pose. 
[20] !d.-Licenses and Police Regulations.-Where unclaimed im-
pounded animals may, under the terms of a city ordinance, be 
turned over only to such institutions as will use them "for 
the good of mankind and the increase of knowledge relating 
to the cause, prevention, control and cure of disease," and 
Health & Saf. Code, § 1650, expressly recognizes that "pub-
lic health and welfare depend on the humane use of animals" 
for medical research, the fact that private laboratories may 
derive some incidental benefit from the use of the animals 
is immaterial. 
[21] !d.-Licenses and Police Regulations.-A city ordinance re-
lating to surrender of unclaimed impounded animals for pur-
pose of medical research is not unconstitutional on the ground 
that the city health officer is invested with uncontrolled arbi-
trary discretion to determine which institutions are qualified 
to receive such animals, where the ordinance describes the 
kinds of institutions which may apply for unclaimed animals 
and provides that the health officer is to certify any reputable 
organization on being satisfied that the animals will be used 
humanely for the specified purpose, since this constitutes a 
sufficient standard for the guidance of the city health officer. 
[22] !d.-Licenses and Police Regulations.-A city ordinance re-
lating to surrender of unclaimed impounded animals for pur-
pose of medical research is not special legislation which dis-
criminates in favor of some institutions and denies equal 
protection to others because the city health officer is empow-
ered to certify only certain types of institutions and only 
those located within the city, where the classification of per-
missible organizations is designed properly for the general 
health and welfare of the public, and it is not unreasonable 
to confine his investigations to organizations which are within 
the city limits in view of the requirement that he may certify 
only those institutions which he is satisfled will use the animals 
for the designated purpose. 
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APPBAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. ClarE'nec JVI. Hanson, .Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to restrain enforcement of a city ordinance relating 
to surrender of unclaimed impounded animals for purpose 
of medical research. ,Judgment for defendants affirmed. 
Brooks Gifford and Moni::; T.1avine for Appellants. 
Hay L. Chesebro, City Attorney, William H. Neal and 
Bourke Jones, Assistant City Attorneys, and Alan G. Camp-
bell, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents. 
Musick & Burrell, Howard Burrell, James E. Bednar, 
Stephens, Jones & La Fever, Raymond W. Stephens, McGin-
ley & Hanson and John P. McGinley for Interveners and He-
spondents. 
GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiffs seek to restrain defendant city 
and two officials from carrying into effect subsection (h) of 
section 53.11 of a Los Angeles city ordinance* which provides, 
*The ordinance is known as the Los Angeles Municipal Code. Sub-
section (h) provides: "Whenever any reputable institutions of learn-
ing, hospitals, research laboratories or their allied institutes in the 
City of Los Angeles shall make application to the Health Officer of 
the City of Los Angeles for permission to use humanely unclaimed im-
pounded animals for the good of mankind and the increase of knowl-
edge relating to the cause, prevention, control and cure of disease, the 
Health Officer, on being satisfied that the said animals are to be so 
used, shall, from time to time, certify to the Department of Animal 
Regulation the names and addresses of said institutions of learning, 
hospitals, research laboratories and their allied institutes which he is 
satisfied will use animals humanely for the purposes above specified. 
"It shall be the duty of the Department of Animal Regulation to 
surrender unclaimed impounded animals for such uses only when ap-
plied for by the institutions of learning, hospitals, research labora-
tories and their allied institutes which have been certified by the 
Health Officer as herein provided. No animal shall be surrendered 
except as authorized by law. 
''In order to give the owners of impounded animals time within 
which to reclaim the same, no animal shall be surrendered for such 
uses until it has been impounded for a period of at least five days. 
''No animal shall be surrendered for medical research, the owner 
of which has turned over such animal to the Department of Animal 
Regulation for destruction. Any such request for destruction of an 
animal by the owner thereof shall be complied with by the Depart-
ment. 
''The Department of Animal Regulation shall adopt and enforce 
rules and regulations providing for the care of animals so surrendered 
comparable to Supplement 211 Public Health Reports, 1949, Federal 
Security Agency, entitled, 'Care of the Dog Used in Medical Re-
search.' '' 
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in part, that the Department of Animal Regulation shall 
surrender unclaimed animals which have been impounded for 
five days to reputable institutions of learning, hospitals and 
laboratories that have been certified by the city health officer 
as organizations which will use animals humanely for the 
good of mankind in medical research. General demurrers 
were sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiffs failed to 
amend, and judgment was thereafter entered in favor of de-
fendants. 
The complaint alleges that three of the plaintiffs are resi-
dent taxpayers who own dogs licensed by the city, that the 
fourth plaintiff resides in adjacent unincorporated territory 
and owns a dog licensed by the county, that these dogs have 
recently become estrays without fault on the part of their 
respective owners and that plaintiffs have made due and dili-
gent inquiry but have been unable to locate their pets. There 
is no allegation as to what happened to the dogs, but it is 
alleged that they are subject to seizure and impounding by 
the Department of Animal Regulation and that defendants 
threaten to enforce subsection (h) of section 53.11 and to 
surrender unclaimed impounded dogs for medical research. It 
is contended that this portion of the ordinance is invalid be-
cause of asserted irregularities in connection with the elec-
tion at which it was adopted, that it conflicts with state law, 
that its enforcement will deprive plaintiffs of their dogs with-
out due process of law and constitute an unlawful taking of 
private property, and that it provides for a gift of public 
property. It is also asserted that the ordinance improperly 
vests uncontrolled discretion in the health officer and per-
mits him to discriminate arbitrarily between research insti-
tutions and that it is invalid as special legislation because 
it grants privileges to a limited class of institutions. 
[1] A preliminary question has been raised as to plain-
tiffs' right to bring the action, but it is sufficient to note 
that the complaint alleges that three of the plaintiffs are resi-
dent citizens and taxpayers of the city and that enforcement 
of' the ordinance will result in unlawful expenditures of 
municipal funds. As such taxpayers, they are entitled to 
sue to prevent the alleged illegal expenditures. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 526a; Clouse v. City of San Diego, 159 Cal. 434, 
438 [114 P. 573]; Wirin v. IIorrall, 85 Cal.App.2d 497, 504-
505 [193 P.2d 470]; see Crowe v. Boyle, 184 Cal. 117, 152 
[193 P. 111]; Yarnell v. City of Los Angeles, 87 Cal. 603, 610 
[25 P. 767].) 
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In support of their claim that subsection (h) was not legally 
adopted, plaintiffs allege that the opponents of the measure 
followed instructions from an assistant city attorney that any 
printed arguments which the opponents desired to have 
mailed to the voters with the sample ballots must be on news-
print of a specified size and that no rotogravure would be 
allowed. Plaintiffs complain that the city clerk permitted 
proponents of the measure to use leaflets of a larger size 
which were processed by rotogravure on slick paper, and 
that as a result a substantial number of voters cast their 
votes in favor of the measure because of the more attractive 
appearance of proponents' arguments. [2] Courts are re-
luctant to defeat the fair expression of popular will in elec-
tions and will not do so unless required by the plain man-
date of the law. (See Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 12 
Cal.2d 412, 426-427 [84 P.2d 1934] ; In re East Bay etc. 
Water Bonds of 1925, 196 Cal. 725, 744 [239 P. 38] ; Rideout 
v. City of Los Angeles, 185 Cal. 426, 430 [197 P. 74] .) 
[3] It is asserted by defendants, and not disputed by plain-
tiffs, that the arguments were prepared pursuant to sections 
275 and 289 of the r~os Angeles City Charter, which pro-
vide that the clerk shall prescribe the form of printing and 
the character of paper to be used. There is no allegation 
in the complaint that the city clerk acted improperly or 
that he was aware of the instructions assertedly given to 
the opponents of the measure by the assistant city attorney. 
Moreover, it does not appear that the assistant city attorney 
had any authority to bind the city by giving such instructions. 
It follows that the matters complained of do not constitute 
grounds for invalidating the adoption of the measure. 
Plaintiffs also allege that the argument of the proponents 
which was mailed to the voters failed to conform with the 
provisions of section 343 of the Election Code of the City 
of Los Angeles. The complaint, however, does not quote the 
language of the srction or state its effect. nor does it give 
the title or date of passage. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 459.) 
[4] \Ve cannot take judieialnotice of city ordinances. (See 
C1:ty of Oakland v. Brock, 8 Ca1.2d 639, 641 [67 P.2d 344] .) 
[5] Under the circumstances the pleading is insufficient. 
(City of 1'ulm·e v. Hevrcn. 126 Cal. 226, 229-231 r 58 P. 530].) 
The next question is whether the portion of the ordinance 
under attack is invalid because of asserted conflicts with 
state laws. [6] In our opinion, the licensing, impounding 
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and disposition of dogs is not exclusively a municipal affair, 
and, therefore, if there is any eonflict between the ordinance 
and the state law, the latter will prevail. ( Const., art. XI, 
§ ] 1; see Eastlick v. C1:ty of Los Angeles, 29 Cal.2d 661, 666 
[177 P.2d 558, 170 A.L.R. 225]; In re Portnoy, 21 Cal.2d 
237, 239-240 [131 P.2d 1] ; Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 
370-371 [125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515] .) [7] The city, 
however, under its police power, may enact local measures 
which do not conflict with general statutes. ( Const., art. XI, 
§ 11.) 
[8] Sections 391 to 403 of the Agricultural Code do not 
operate to invalidate the ordinance. The code sections regu-
late the seizure and disposition of estrayed stock and domestic 
animals generally, and it is expressly provided that nothing 
therein shall affect municipal regulations regarding estrays. 
(Agr. Code, § 400.) [9] Similarly there is no inconsistency 
between subsection (h) and another general law which re-
lates to the running at large of dogs and the protection of 
livestock and provides for the licensing, impounding and 
disposition of dogs. ( 1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 384; Stats. 
1921, p. 1306, as amended.) Subsection (h) will, of course, 
be read as applying only to dogs which have been lawfully 
impounded, and the statute expressly recognizes the power 
of local bodies to provide for ''the killing in some humane 
manner or other disposition of" lawfully impounded dogs. 
(1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 384, §§ 6, 7.5.) 
[10] Sections 597, 599b and 599c of the Penal Code which 
define and prohibit cruelty to animals are applicable gen-
erally throughout the state, but they do not occupy the field 
in which the ordinance operates, and there is nothing therein 
''"hich eonflicts with their provisions. [11] Seetion 599c of 
the Penal Code provides that nothing in the sections relat-
ing to cruelty to animals shall be construed as ''interfering 
... with properly condueted seientific experiments or in-
vestigations performed under the authority of the faculty 
of a regularly incorporated medical college or university of 
this state.'' lt thns appears that thr basie purpose of section 
599c is to limit the effeet of the provisions prohibiting eruelty 
to animals rather than to regulate the disposition of im-
pounded animals. The section does not purport to designate 
all the institutions which may receive such animals for ex-
perimental purposes or to forbid experimentation by other 
than those it names, and it cannot reasonably be said that 
the Legislature intended to indicate that proper and humane 
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experiments can be eonducted only under the authority of 
the faculty of a regularly incorporated medical college or 
university. [12] While it is true that, under the ordi-
nance, research institutions other than medical colleges or 
universities may receive animals for experimental purposes, 
this obviously does not conflict with the Penal Code pro-
hibition of cruel or improper experiments. Instead, as we 
have seen, it is specifically provided that the hospitals or 
research institutions which receive dogs must have been 
certified as organizations which will use them "humanely 
. . . for the good of mankind and the increase of knowledge 
relating to the cause, prevention, control and cure of disease.'' 
Our conclusion in this connection is strengthened by sections 
1650 to 1677 of the Health and Safety Code, enacted in 1951, 
which provide for state regulation of the use of animals for 
medical research. Sections 1651 and 1667 permit such use 
by any "person ... laboratory, firm, association, corpora-
tion, copartnership, and educational institution," upon com-
pliance with certain rules, and section 1670 expressly pro-
vides that nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit 
or restrict the right of cities to adopt or enforce ordinances 
regulating the use or procurement of animals for medical 
research. 
We come next to plaintiffs' contention that enforcement of 
the ordinance will deprive them of their property without due 
process of law. [13] It is well settled that the licensing 
of dogs and the regulation of the manner in which they shall 
be kept and controlled are within the legitimate sphere of 
the police power, and that statutes and ordinances may pro-
vide for impounding dogs and for their destruction or other 
(lisposition. (Hofer v. Carson, 102 Ore. 545 [203 P. 323, 326]; 
see In re Ackerman, 6 Cal.App. 5, 13-14, 16-17 [91 P. 429]; 
Sentell v. New Orleans & C. Rnilroad Co. [1897], 166 U.S. 698 
[17 S.Ct. 693, 695-696, 41 hEel. 1169]; 8 A.L.R. 67, 74-76; 2 
Am.Jur. 719, 721, 799.) The complaint does not attack the 
right of the city to provide for the impounding of stray dogs 
or for the disposition of impounded dogs by such methods as 
are covered by other portions of section 53.11 of the ordinance, 
namely sale, destruction, or gift to the armed forces, but plain-
tiffs assert that the surrender of animals for medical research 
pursuant to the ordinance amounts to an unlawful taking of 
private property. [14] It is clear, however, that when dogs 
have been lawfully impounded under the police power and 
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have become t:mbject to disposition under the terms of the 
ordinanee by any of the means noted above, private property 
rights in such dogs must, in the interest of public welfare, be 
treated as having been terminated. 
[15] Plaintiffs also contend that subsection (h) is invalid 
because it does not contain any provision for notice to the 
owner of an impounded dog. 'l'his subsection provides that 
"no animal shall be surrendered [for medical research] ex-
cept as authorized by law'' and that ''in order to give the 
owners of impounded animals time within which to reclaim 
the same, no animal shall be surrendered for such uses until 
it has been impounded for a period of at least five days.'' 
Under subsection (b)* the owner, if known, must be notified 
in every case where a dog is impounded, regardless of the 
proposed method of disposing of the animal, and the city must 
act to give such notice within one day after the dog is im-
pounded. rrhe provision of subsection (h) that no animal 
shall be surrendered except as authorized by law clearly con-
templates and requires compliance with all other applicable 
subdivisions, including the notice provisions of subsection (b). 
The courts, whenever possible, adopt that interpretation of a 
statute which will render it constitutional, and, therefore, the 
subsections should be read together for the purpose of avoiding 
any question of invalidity arising from the Jack of a specific 
notice requirement in subsection (h). 
·when considered together the subsections require that the 
city must act to give notice to the owner, if known, within 
one day after a dog is impounded and that the owner must 
have at least five days after receipt of such notice in which 
to reclaim the animal. [16] Subsection (b) does not specify 
the method by which the owner shall be notified of the im-
pounding, and since there is nothing elsewhere in the ordi-
nance to indicate that any particular form of notice is con-
templated, the owner, under the authorities, is entitled to 
actual notice. (See Colyear v. ToMiner, 7 Cal.2d 735, 743 
l62 P.2d 741, 109 A.L.R 191]; Johnson v. Barreiro, 59 Cal. 
App.2d 213, 218 [138 P.2d 746]; cf. Stockton Automobile Co. 
*Subsection (b) provides: "In the case of dogs, the Department of 
Animal Regulation shall hold such animal for a period of one (1) day 
after the impounding of such animal, during which time the owner 
of said animal, if known, shall be notified, after which time said ani-
mal may be sold by an officer of the Department in the same manner 
as provided in" this Section for tlie sale of other animals except that 
notice of sale need be posted for only two (2) days in the places named 
in this section.' ' 
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v. Confer, 154 Cal. 402, 408 r97 P. 881] ; Long v. Chronicle 
Pub. Co., 68 Cal.App. 171, 179 [228 P. 873]; Alphonzo E. 
Bell Corp. v. Listle, 55 Cal.App.2d 300, 306 [130 P.2d 251] .) 
'Ne nred not speculate as to the possible methods by which 
actual notice may be given to a known owner, since we may 
assume that the city will proceed in a manner sufficient to 
meet all requirements of law. The provision of :mbsec-
tion (h) that, "in order to give the owners ... time with-
in which to reclaim tfw same,'' no animal shall be surrendered 
for me(1ical research until it has been impounded for "at 
lt>ast five days'' was obvionsly intended to afford an owner 
ample opportunity to reclaim his animal, and in our opinion 
the subsections should be construed as providing that the five 
(lay period does not begin to run against a known owner 
nntil he has received actnal notice of the impounding. So 
construed, the ordinanee affords adequate notiee to an owner 
whose identity is known. 
[17] If a dog is wearing a license tag as required by sec-
tion 53.15 et seq. of the ordinance, the name and address 
of its owner will be available to the Department of Animal 
Regulation so that notice may be given. By prescribing a 
system of licenses and requiring dogs to wear a numbered tag 
at all times when at large on the streets, the city has done 
all it can to make sure that it will know the owner's identity. 
The tag requirement is reasonable, and an owner ean insure 
his getting notice in all but exceptional cases by complying 
with the ordinanee. If a dog is not wearing a lieense tag when 
impounded, its owner will not have any ground to complain 
of a failure to receive notice, because the ordinance places 
upon him the duty to make sure that the rlog wears its lieense 
tag at all times except when it is indoors or in an enclosed 
yard or pen. (Ordinance, § 53.21.) In view of the foregoing 
it is mmeeessary for us to consider whether an ordinance of 
this type would br~ inyalid if it did not eontain a provision for 
noti('e. (See 8ndr77 Y. Xew OrlNms (\- 0. Railroad Co. [1R!"l7l. 
166 F.S. 698, 704-706 rn S.Ct. 60~1. 68:1-606. 41 TJ.Ed. 1169]; 
and cases cited in 8 A.hR. 67, 74-76.) 
[18] There is no merit to plaintiffs' contention that the 
ordinaner~ deprives them of their property without a hearing. 
Section 53.13 provides that an owner may redeem an im-
pounded animal upon payment of certain fees and charges, 
anrl sertion 53.12. whieh sets forth the charg-es to be collected 
by the Department of Animal Regulation, states that "No 
fees whatsoever shall be charged or collected for or on account 
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of any animal which has been unlawfully taken up or im-
pounded, and any such animal shall be immediately delivered 
upon demand therefor to the owner or person entitled to the 
custody thereof.'' The ordinance thus contemplates that a 
factual or mixed factual and legal determination shall be 
made by the department, and under these circumstances it 
must be interpreted to provide for a hearing, when requested 
by the owner, upon the question of whether a dog has been 
ll"gall.v seized. ( Cf. FasC?:nation, Inc. v. Iloover, 39 Cal.2d 
260, 268-211 [246 P.2d 656].) If, on the other hand, the owner 
of a dog concedes the legality of the impounding and fails to 
redeem the dog or to exercise his right under the subsection 
to demand that the dog be destroyed rather than turned over 
for medical research, there is no further need for a hearing. 
[19] The surrender of impounded, unclaimed animals to 
private research laboratories and institutions is not a gift of 
public property within the meaning of sections 22 and 31 of 
article IV of the California Constitution, since the animals 
arc to be used for a public purpose. ( Cf. Califo1·nia Emp. 
Stab. Com .. v. Payne, 31 Cal.2d 210, 216 [187 P.2d 702] ; 
County of Los Angeles v. La F1wnte, 20 Cal.2d 870, 877 [129 
P.2d 3781 ; County of Alameda v. Janssen, 16 Cal.2d 276. 
281-282 [106 P.2d 11, 130 A.L.R. 1141].) [20] Under the 
terms of the ordinance animals may be turned over only to 
snch institutions as will usc them ''for the good of mankind 
and the increase of knowledge relating to the cause, preven-
tion, control and cure of disease,'' and the Health and Safety 
Code expressly recognizes that "public health and welfare 
depend on the humane use of animals'' for medical research. 
(Health & Saf. Cocle, § 1650.) Under these circumstances the 
fact that private laboratories may derive some incidental 
benefit from the nse of the animals is immaterial. (California 
J!Jmp. Stab. Corn. v. Payne, sup1·a, 31 Cal.2d 210, 216; Countu 
of Alamecla v. Janssen, snpra, 16 Cal. 276, 281.) 
[21] Another ground of asserted unconstitutionality is 
that the city health officer is invested with uncontrolled arbi-
trary discretion to determine which institutions are qualified 
to receive impounded animals for purposes of medical research. 
As we have seen. howr~ver, the ordinance describes the kinds 
of institutions which may apply for unclaimed animals and 
provides that the health officer is to certify any reputable 
organization on being satisfied that the animals will be used 
humanely for the specified purposes. In our opinion this con-
stitutes a sufficient standard for the guidance of the city hea.lth 
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officer. Ji is ohYionsJy llllllt'<oPRfiary for 1fw ordina,n(•p (O (k-
finP what eonstiintPs a n•pntahle institntion or a hnmane u:;;e 
of animal~-1, HlHl in virw of the 111nnher and var·iety of medi-
cal experiments in vohing the 11se of animals and the rapid 
ehanges in medical seience this appears to be a situation in 
which the broad type of standard set forth in the ordinance is 
appropriate. ( Cf. Carm:netti v. Pacific Mtct. L. Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 
:2c1 344, 364 [l:iD P.2cl ; Bnttenvorth v. Boyd, 12 Cal.2d 
140, 148-149 [82 P.2d 434, 1:26 A.L.R 838]; GayTm·d v. City 
of Pas<Idena, J73 Cal. 4;)8, 4i39-440 [166 P. 848].) 
[22] 'l'he final objeetion is that subsection (h) is special 
legislation vvhich disc1·iminates in favor of some institutions 
and denies eq nal protection to others because the city health 
officer is empcnverecl to certify only certain types of institu-
tions and ouly those located within the city of Los Angeles. 
Hrm-ever, tl1e organizations which the health officer is author-
ized to certify are reputable institutions of learning, hos-
pitals and laboratories whieh will use animals humanely in 
medical researeh for the good of mankind. 'l'his classification 
is dcsig·ned properly for the promotion of the general health 
and welfare of the public. Nor is there anything improper in 
l't•strictiug the institutions which may receive animals to those 
which are located within the city of Los Angeles. Since the 
eity health officer may certify only those institutions which he 
is satisfied will use animals for the designated purpose, it is 
not unreasonable to confine his investigations to organization!'\ 
which are within the city limits. 
'l'he judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., 'l'raynor, .T., Spence, ,T., and Van Dyke, ,J. pro 
tem., concurred. 
CAR'l'ER, J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree with the construction placed by the major-
ity on the sections of the ordinanee in question or that the 
notice provisions contained in those sections are sufficient 
to afford due proeess of law. Subsection (b) of seetion 53.11 
provides that an owner must be notified within one day after 
a dog is impounded and that the animal may be sold there-
after if notice of sale is posted for two days; under subsection 
(h) it is provided that no dog may be st~rrendM·ed to a cert·i-
fied institution for experimental purposes unless it has been 
impounded for at least five days. The majority of this court 
indulges in some legerdemain in the field of judicial legisla-
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tion and <'omes np wit'n ih<' startling n~sult that these two 
sPetiom; mm;t hr read togdlwr: that the one day notice pro-
vision in snbRedion (hl applies to :;;ub;wction (h). By read-
ing them togPthm·, Uw nmjority rewrites the ordinance so 
that it provides that au owner has five days after receipt 
of actual notice in which to reclaim his dog before it is sur-
rendered for experimental purposes. 'l'his is done, we are 
informed, ''for the purpose of avoiding any question of in-
validity arisi71[J fnnn the lack of a specific notice r·equircment 
in subscct?:on (h)." Using reasoning such as this, any statute 
could be ''interpreted'' in such a way as to render it consti-
tutional. 
'l'he only notice provi::;ion applies to dogs about to be sold. 
'fhere is no notice provision in the subsection providing for 
surrender of such dogs for experimental purposes. The sale 
of a dog and its surrender for exphimental purposes are 
two entirely different things and there is no basis in logic 
for the statement of the majority that these two subsec-
tions must be read together and that the notice provision of 
the sale subsection applies to the surrender subsection. Sub-
section (b) deals specifically and exclusively with the sale 
of impounded dogs; subsection (h) deals only with the sur-
render of unclaimed, impounded animals for experimental 
purposes. The only provision of subsection (h) of section 
53.11 which could possibly be construed as providing for any 
notice is that which reads: ''In order to give the owners of 
impounded animals time within which to reclaim the same, 
no animal shall be surrendered for such uses until it has 
been impounded for a period of at least five days.'' But 
we are informed by the majority that subsection (b) which 
provides that the owner of the animal, if known, shall be 
notified within a period of one day, applies "regardless of 
the proposed method of disposing of the animal." We are 
told that this meanc;; "actual notice" but that "We need 
not speculate as to the possible methods by which actual 
notice may be given to a known owner, since we may assume 
that the city will proceed in a manner sufficient to meet all 
requirements of law.'' 't'he subsection provides that the De-
partment of Animal Regulation "shall hold such animal for 
a pe1·iocl of one (1) day after the 1'mpounding of such animal, 
du.rinq which time the owner of said animal, if known, shall 
be notified, after which t1'me said am:mal may be sold . ... " 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The notice provision in subsection (b) which is to be read 
into subsection (h) does not take into consideration the fact 
that even if the name of the registered owner appears on the 
license tag, that one day's mailed notice in the city of Los 
Angeles is unreasonable and insufficient. It is pointed out 
in the brief:;;, that dnc to the present condition of the mail 
delivery service, it usually talces two days for ordinary mail 
to reach its addressee who resides within the city limits. It 
does not take into considrration the faet that the owner of 
the dog may not have a telephone; that the owner of the 
dog might be out of town. It does not take into consideration 
the length of time it might take an employee of the particular 
pound in question to ascertain, hom the Department of Ani-
mal Regulation, the full name, address, telephone number, 
etc. of the owner of the dog. And, it should not be over-
looked that the majority, in construing the notice required 
to be actual notice received by the owner, has overlooked the 
provision of the subsection which provides, by the use of 
mandatory language, that the animal shall be held for one 
day, during which time the owner shall be notified, and that 
after that time, the animal may be sold after posting notice 
of sale for two days. This section provides for a th1·ee day 
period at the most before an impounded animal may be sold. 
It should be noted, in this respect, that the posted notices 
are to be placed at ( 1) the public pound; ( 2) the city hall; 
( 3) the central poliee station. There are five public pounds 
in J_,os Angeles. At which one is the notice to be posted? 
I cannot understand how the one day provision in sub-
section (b) can possibly be construed to mean that the owner 
of the dog must be given actual notice which must be re-
eeived and that he thereafter (subsection (h)) has five days 
within which to reclaim his dog. However, by such reason-
ing, a majority of this court, has now placed the constitu-
tional stamp of approvnl npon the ordinance. In my opinion 
the notiee provision;:: are immfficient to afford dne process 
of' law. 
In judging what is due process of law, the sufficiency of 
the notice must be determined in eaeh case from the particular 
circumstanees of the ease in 1Hmd, respect being had to the 
cause and object of the taking ( W1dzcn v. Board of Snper-
vison, 101 Cal. J5 !35 P. 358, 40 Am.St.Hep. 171; Imperial 
Water Oo. v. Boarcl of Super?Fisors, Hi2 Cal. 14 !120 P. 780] ). 
Wl1ile it is impossible to define with preeision "due process 
of law" it means, broadly speaking, that before a man's 
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property may be taken by the state, he must be given notice 
of the proceedings which may terminate in the taking, and 
be given an opportunity to be heard. It means further that 
the notice shall be a real and reasonable one, and the hearing, 
such as is ordinarily, or at least reasonably, given in similar 
cases (Beck v. Ransome-Crummey Co., 42 Cal.App. 74 [184 
P. 431]). Particularly applicable here is the statement found 
in People v. Broad, 216 Cal. 1 [12 P.2d 941], where this 
court said ''. . . the essential validity of the law was to be 
tested not by what has been done under it, but what may by 
its authority be done; and where a statute makes no provision 
for hearing or notice, either actual or constructive, such 
defect is not supplied by the vol~[ntary adoption by public 
officers of rules covering the situation." In Roller v. Holly, 
176 U.S. 398, 409 [20 S.Ct. 410, 44 L.Ed. 520], it was said 
"That a man is entitled to some notice before he can be de-
prived of his liberty or property, is an axiom of the law 
to which no citation of authority would give additional weight; 
but upon the question of the length of such notice there is 
a singular dearth of judicial decision. It is manifest that 
the requirement of notice would be of no value whatever, 
unless such notice were reasonable and adequate for the pur-
pose (DaV1:dson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 [24 L.Ed. 616]; 
Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701-712 [ 4 S.Ct. 663, 
28 L.Ed. 569])." In that case, it was held ( 413) tha.t "With-
out undertaking to determine what is a reasonable ·notice to 
nonresidents, we are of opinion, under the circumstances of 
this case, and considering the distance between the place of 
service and the place of return, that five days was not a 
reasonable notice, or due process of law. . . . '' The Roller 
case was followed in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &; 
.Tn~st Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 [70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865], 
where it was said ''An elementary and fundamental require-
ment of due process in any proceeding which is to be ac-
corded finality 1:s notice reasonably calcttlated, under all the 
circumstances, to apzJrise inter·ested parties of the pendency 
of the action and a;fforcl them an opportunity to present their 
obJections, Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 [61 S.Ct. 339, 85 
hE d. 278, ] 32 A.L.R. 1357] ; Gmnnis v. Orclean, 234 U.S. 
:58;) 184 S.Ct. 779. G8 I1.Ed. 13631; Priest v. [,as Vegas, 
~:l~ !l.S. (i04 I :!4 S.<'t. 44:~. Gl'\ T1.E!l. 7511; Rollet· v. Holly, 
176 U.S. 398 [20 S.Ct. 410, 44 L.Ed. 520]. The notice must 
he of such nature as reasonably to convey the required in-
formation, Granm:s v. Ordean, supra, and it must afford a 
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rf'asonahl0 time for those inteJ'f'ster! to make their appear-
ance. . . . But when notice is a person's due, process which 
is a mere gesture is not rlue proeess.'' And in Griffin v. Griffin, 
327 U.S. 220, 228 [66 S.Ct. 556, 90 !J.Ed. 685], it was said 
"It is plain in any case that a judgment in personam direct-
ing execution to issue against petitioner, and thus purporting 
to cut off all available defenses, could not be rendered on any 
theory of the State's power over him, without some form of 
notice by personal or substituted service. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 
276 U.S. 13, 18-20 [48 S.Ct. 259, 72 L.Ed. 446]; Restatement 
of Conflict of Law, § 75; and compare Milliken v. JJ:leyer, 311 
U.S. 457 [61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278, 132 A.L.R. 1357]. Such 
notice cannot be dispensed with even in the case of jttdgments 
in rem with respect to property within the jurisdiction of the 
court rendering the jttdgment. Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 
409 [20 S.Ct. 410,44 L.Ed. 520]." (Emphasis added.) 
If the dog is not wearing a license tag, the majority says 
that ''its owner will not have any ground to complain of a 
failure to receive notice, because the ordinance places upon 
him the duty to make sure that the dog wears its license tag 
at all times except when it is indoors or in an enclosed yard 
or pen." Apparently we now forget about the one day notice, 
actual and received, and the dog is held for the prescribed 
(snbsection (h)) period of five days before being surrendered 
to a hospital or institution for experimental purposes. Under 
reasoning of the type indulged in by the majority, we can 
read the ordinance as circumstances warrant. So now, no 
notice being practicable, we just look to the five day pro-
vision. This period of time is unreasonable. It does not take 
into consideration the fact that duly licensed dogs may lose 
their tags after straying; that they may, and do, break their 
eollars thereby losing their tags; that strangers may remove 
either collar or tag; that dogs may escape from enclosed pens, 
or get out of the houses of their owners (where they are not 
required to vvear tags) and wander far afield. It does not take 
into eonsideration the not-unusual cases of theft of valuable, 
registered dogs. It does not take into eonsic1eration the size 
of the city of Los Angeles with its five pounds, and four 
private shelters, and 19 pounds and animal shelters in Los 
Angeles County, or the fact that the owner of the dog might 
be out of the city when his dog escapes from his home and 
the person caring for it, or from a kennel where he has left 
it to be cared for. 
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The majority, in pla(~ing its approval upon this five day 
p('J"iod, has failN1 to consider that when a dog is missing, the 
owner aRs1!llWS, often eorrectly, that the clog will come home 
the next day and therefore does nothing for a one day 
period; that the dog may be a "wanderer" who has always 
returned from his prior wanderings; and that dogs do not seek 
the nearest pound, or shelter, upon running away. No con-
,;ideration is given to the obvious fact that the owner of the 
dog may advertise for his lost pet, that he may for the first 
few days of the dog's absence call at the pounds and shelters 
with no success, only to have the clog picked up later when he 
has started to advertise for its return. In my opinion, due pro-
eess of law requires that the ordinance provide for some type 
of notiee in eases where the dog is not wearing a license tag. 
'rhat notice could be by newspaper advertisement, giving the 
deseription of the dogs impounded, or by radio announeement, 
or by posting descriptions in various places throughout the 
city. 
'l'he ordinanee here involved is, in my opinion, unconstitu-
tional in that it constitutes a taking of property without due 
process of law as the courts have defined that guarantee in 
both the Constitution of the United States and of California. 
I would therefore reverse the judgment. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied March 
19, 195a. Carter, .T., was of the opinion that the petition 
:;;honlr1 be granted. 
